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Abstract:  We report results from an experiment that examines play in an indefinitely repeated, 
2-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Each experimental session involves N subjects and a 
sequence of indefinitely repeated games. The main treatment consists of whether agents are 
matched in fixed pairings or matched randomly in each indefinitely repeated game. Within the 
random matching treatment, we vary the information that players have about their opponents. 
Contrary to a theoretical possibility suggested by Kandori (1992), a cooperative norm does not 
emerge in the treatments where players are matched randomly. On the other hand, in the fixed 
pairings treatment, the evidence suggests that a cooperative norm does emerge as players gain 
more experience.     
 
JEL Codes: C72, C73, C78, C92, D83. 
 


















“Sometimes cooperation emerges where it is least expected.”  -Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation (1984, p. 73). 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Cooperative behavior can expose individuals to possible exploitation by others who are willing 
to act opportunistically.   Nevertheless, cooperation can be sustained if opportunistic behavior 
triggers a punishment that makes ‘cheating’ unattractive.   Much cooperative behavior is 
sustained by decentralized informal enforcement mechanisms.  These mechanisms rely on 
individuals having an interest in how their current actions affect future social interactions.  As 
Kandori (1992) notes, there are two general classes of informal mechanisms:  Personal 
enforcement, where opportunistic behavior today destroys the possible benefits of future 
cooperation between the individual who has been cheated and the cheater; Community 
enforcement, where a cheater is sanctioned by other members of the community who have not 
themselves been victims of that cheater, but nevertheless refuse to engage in cooperative 
endeavors with any cheater.  The Folk Theorem holds for personal enforcement when a 
particular pair of agents has an indefinite number of future interactions with one another and the 
discount factor is sufficiently large.  Kandori shows that public observability is sufficient for the 
folk theorem to hold for community enforcement mechanisms as well.  If the identity of the 
cheater is common knowledge then it does not make any difference if the cheater will have 
repeated future interactions with any particular member of the community or if the cheater will 
simply have an indefinite number of future interactions with various members of the community.  
That is, regardless of matching protocol, with public observability, there exist equilibrium 
strategy profiles that will support the same payoffs as are attainable under a fixed matching 
protocol.
1 More remarkably, Kandori shows that for groups of any fixed size there exist payoff 
                                                 
1 Under public observability, an individual who has been labeled a ‘cheater’ has no incentive to act cooperatively in 
any particular interaction, as long as s/he believes that others will not cooperate with a known ‘cheater’.  Non-
cheaters, in turn, will have little incentive to risk taking a cooperative action with a known ‘cheater’, if they also 
believe that others will not cooperate with this particular individual in the future. Kandori provides two different 
ways of making individual deviations from cooperation unprofitable.  One way depends upon individuals having 
group labels, independent of their actions. Individuals of one group are always matched with individuals of another 
group and once any member of a given group deviates, all members of that group are treated as ‘cheaters’, by all 
members of the other group.  Alternatively, individuals need not have group labels and only ‘cheaters’ are labeled.  
To prevent those who have not yet been labeled as a ‘cheater’ from finding it profitable to avoid acquiring this label,  
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functions such that there is a community enforcement mechanism that will sustain cooperation in 
an indefinitely repeated number of plays of a Prisoner’s Dilemma stage game even when 
individual histories are purely private, individuals are anonymous, and the matching mechanism 
for each stage game is purely random. 
In the anonymous, random matching case, it is the threat that one deviation from 
cooperation will trigger a contagious process of future defections by all who have experienced a 
defection – rather than the threat of being branded a ‘cheater’ – that acts as a deterrent.  For this 
threat to be credible, an individual who has experienced a defection must find it more profitable 
to defect at the next opportunity, even though this will keep the contagious process going, than to 
continue to act cooperatively and stop the process.  Of course, if only a small fraction of the 
population has already been infected, an individual may lose a considerable amount of future 
benefit from the eventual destruction of the cooperative norm.  Therefore, for large groups, the 
threat of starting a contagious process will not be a credible unless either the one time gain from 
cheating is very large, or there is some means of stopping the contagious process thereby limiting 
the loss from the destruction of the social norm.  Ellison (1994) shows how the availability of a 
publicly observable randomization device may be used as a correlation device to signal the end 
of a punishment phase and resumption of a potentially new cooperative phase.
2  
While Kandori shows that a social norm of cooperation can be sustained as a non-
cooperative equilibrium even when individual pairings are both random and anonymous, whether 
or not such norms are likely to emerge under such conditions is clearly an empirical question.  
The experiment described below was specifically designed to address that question. 
 Kandori’s (1992) theorem applies to indefinitely repeated two-person games with 
minimal observation of the past actions of the individuals with whom a player is currently paired 
to play a stage game.  Our experiment is designed, therefore, to study the behavior of individuals 
drawn from a fixed population who play an indefinite sequence of two-person Prisoner’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
it must be the case that a non-cheater can expect to meet other non-cheaters sufficiently frequently in the future to 
make it profitable to give up the one time gain from cheating.  This can be assured with strategies in which a 
cheater’s label is removed after some finite number of stage games.           
 
2  As Ellison shows, it is not necessary to have a public randomization device to limit the period in which a 
contagion process is operating.  But such a device does serve as a signal upon which all individuals can coordinate 
their departure from a punishment phase.  
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Dilemma games under different matching protocols and different amounts of information 
transmission.  The objective of varying the matching protocol (fixed pairings versus random 
matching) is to determine empirically how much difference in the level of cooperative play is 
associated with these different matching protocols.  The objective of varying the information 
transmitted to players (under the random matching protocol only) is to determine whether 
information on the payoff or action history of a player’s opponent, prior to play of the stage 
game, has any effect on the level of cooperative play.  The design also incorporates a randomly 
generated, publicly observable signal that could be used by agents as a device to coordinate the 
end of a punishment phase, if they were to choose strategies of the type described by Ellison 
(1994). 
To foreshadow our experimental results, we find that the initial play of subjects is quite 
similar under both fixed and random matching protocols.  With experience, under fixed pairings,  
cooperation emerges as a norm.  However, under random pairings, non-cooperation is quickly 
established as a norm.  Under random pairings, there is evidence that some individuals attempt to 
coax members of their group to break out of a non-cooperative norm, as Ellison suggests.  But, 
these attempts are futile.  We also find that a social norm of cooperation that is established under 
fixed pairings will be immediately broken when the matching protocol is switched to random 
pairings, while a social norm of non-cooperation under random pairings is also easily displaced 
when the same group is matched under fixed pairings.  Finally, we find little evidence that 
smaller group sizes or the provision of information about an opponent’s past actions or payoff 
history increases the likelihood of a cooperative social norm developing under a random 
matching protocol.      
 
2.  Related Work 
2.1  Indefinitely Repeated Stage Games 
 
By definition, indefinitely repeated stage games have no (predictable) last stage. Therefore, if 
cooperative play is reciprocated in the early stages, a belief in future reciprocity will be 
reinforced and cooperative behavior may be sustained indefinitely.  The concept of an 
indefinitely repeated stage game is implemented experimentally by use of a randomization  
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device to determine after each stage game is played whether the game has ended or another stage 
game is to be played. The probability of continuation determines whether or not there exists a 
cooperative equilibrium in the supergame.  This device was introduced by Roth and Murnighan 
(1978).
3  There are surprisingly few experiments that have been conducted with indefinitely 
repeated stage games.
4  Van Huyck et al. (2002) report an experiment conducted with 
supergames constructed of an indefinite sequence of repetitions of dominance solvable stage 
games, followed by a small fixed number of repetitions of the same stage game. They observed 
that during the probabilistic continuation phase of a supergame whose stage game has an 
equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies, the cooperation level rose dramatically with 
experience. In the Van Huyck et al experiment, all observations were made under a fixed 
pairings protocol.
5  To our knowledge, the only other experiment with an indefinitely repeated 
game played under different matching protocols is reported in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994).
  
They conducted an experiment using an indefinitely repeated N-person provision point voluntary 
contribution game.  This game was played under both fixed and anonymous random matching 
protocols.  Unlike a Prisoners’ Dilemma, non-cooperation is not a dominant strategy in their 
stage game and the stage game has a multiplicity of cooperative equilibria.  They found that 
under random matching, subjects “adhere to cut-point decision rules that are, on average, very 
close to those predicted by the Bayesian equilibrium (of the one-shot game).  Repetition (i.e., 
                                                 
3  In their experiments subjects played an indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma stage game against a pre-
programmed strategy, either tit-for tat, or grim response.  They were interested in testing how responsive 
cooperative play was to variations in the continuation probability. While they found the rate of cooperative play to 
be positively related to the continuation probability, the levels of cooperation they observed were quite far from 
100%.       
 
4  Dal Bó (2005) considers whether the responsiveness of cooperation to an increase in the continuation probability 
observed by Roth and Murnighan is simply a reflection of the increase in the expected number of repetitions of the 
stage game before a relationship is terminated, or whether behavior in games of indefinite length is fundamentally 
different from behavior in games of finite repetitions of a prisoners’ dilemma stage game.  He finds that the 
percentage of cooperative play in finitely repeated games of a given length is lower than indefinitely repeated games 
of the same expected length. 
   
5 Holt (1985) also reports an experiment with an indefinitely repeated duopoly game conducted under fixed 
pairings. Like Van Huyck et al, a basic treatment variable was whether the game was an indefinitely repeated 
supergame or a finitely repeated game. In the supergame treatment, the median of the distribution of final period 
outputs was much closer to the Nash equilibrium than to a collusive, joint profit maximizing output. Aoyagi and 
Frechette (2003) also report an experiment conducted with supergames constructed from an indefinite sequence of a 
prisoner’s dilemma game with noisy public signals. Their subjects also played under fixed pairings.  They found that 




fixed matching) leads to more cooperative behavior (than observed with random 
matching)...(but) the observed magnitudes of improvement are much smaller than predicted 
(assuming that random matching corresponds to the play of a one-shot game).”  The fact that 
subjects did not come close to fully exploiting the opportunities for coordination and cooperation 
under either the fixed or random matching protocols in the Palfrey-Rosenthal experiment is, 
perhaps, not surprising.  Their stage game is a game of incomplete information. The symmetric 
cut-point strategy that maximizes expected joint profits is not transparent. That game has a 
multiplicity of equilibria in non-symmetric pure strategies and there is no evidence of any effort 
to coordinate on a pure strategy equilibrium.  By using a prisoner’s dilemma as our stage game in 





The Kandori theorem implies that a cooperative norm can develop even in the absence of any 
information being transmitted about one player’s past actions or experience to the other player 
with whom he is currently paired.  Nevertheless, one might expect players to act differently if 
such information is transmitted than if it is not.  Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2001) report an 
experiment with a finitely repeated stage game in which each player may carry with him an 
image score that reflects some information about the past experience of that player.  This 
information, but not the identity of the player, is observable to the other person with whom s/he 
is matched in the current stage game.     At the beginning of each stage game individuals are 
randomly paired, and once paired a random draw determines the choice of dictator. The dictator 
can either ‘Give’ the receiver a large payoff and receive no payoff himself, or ‘Take’ a small 
payoff himself and give the receiver nothing.  The issue they explore is whether a concern for 
one’s future image influences the current behavior of a ‘dictator’.  They find that when the 
opportunity cost of being nice is high,  ‘giving’ is much lower when there is no image score than 
when there is an image score. Because their stage game is finitely repeated, Kandori’s theorem 
does not directly apply.  Indeed, in their game, the only sequentially perfect equilibrium is to  
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‘Take’.  Nevertheless, this experiment suggests that information transmission may make a 
difference in the play of a game under a random matching protocol. 
Another related experiment was conducted by Schwartz, Young and Zvinakis (2000). 
They use a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma as the stage game in their experimental design.  Their 
stage game is played for an indefinite number of times under a random matching protocol.  
Subjects remain anonymous. However, under different treatments, different portions of a 
player’s past history are revealed to the person with whom s/he is currently matched.  They find 
that these disclosure conditions have a large effect on the initial levels of cooperation observed.  
However, under either information condition, they observe a decline in cooperation as subjects 
gain experience. Like Bolton, et al., the results of Schwartz and his associates indicate that 
among inexperienced subjects, in environments where cooperation can only be reciprocated 
indirectly, information transmission can have significant effects on behavior.  What is left open 
is whether these effects can sustain a cooperative equilibrium as subjects gain experience.  
Conversely, it is still unknown whether anonymous random matching with no information 




3.  The Experiment 
3.1 Experimental Design 
 
In all sessions of our experiment we use an indefinite repetition of the Prisoner’s dilemma stage 
game shown in Figure 1. 
                                                 
6 Andreoni and Croson (2002) assess the effect of random re-matching (strangers) versus fixed matchings (partners) 
in the context of finitely repeated, n>2-player voluntary public good game experiments. Examining several different 
studies, they find inconsistent evidence on the effect that random (fixed) matching has on the level of contributions 
to a public good. By contrast, in this paper, we focus on two-player, indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games 





The infinite horizon supergame was constructed as follows. Following play of the stage game, a 
random draw was made from a uniform distribution over the range [1, 100]. The draw was made 
by the computer program that was used to carry out the experiment (students made their choices 
and observed the outcomes on networked computer workstations) and the number chosen was 
displayed in a pop-up box on all player’s computer screens to reinforce the random nature of the 
draws.   If the draw was less than or equal to 90, players were matched according to the given 
protocol and the stage game was repeated.  If the random draw exceeded 90 the supergame was 
ended.  Thus, the probability, p, that a supergame continues is .90 and the expected number of 
future rounds to be played from the perspective of any round reached is always 1/(1-p) or 10. 
This is equivalent to an infinite horizon where the discount factor attached to future payoffs is 
.90 per round.  Once a supergame ended, depending on the time available, another supergame 
would begin with the same stage game, matching protocol and population of players used in all 
previous supergames of the experimental session.
   
  Note that the random draw is useful not only for implementing an indefinite horizon. It 
can also be used as a publicly observable randomization device enabling players to implement 
the kinds of strategies found in Ellison (1994), where the randomization device is used to 
coordinate a halt to a contagious defection phase of play and resumption of a potentially new 
cooperative phase of play of the repeated game. 
The stage game payoffs and the discount factor were chosen such that for the population 
size of players we consider, N<14, there exists a perfect, sequential equilibrium that supports 
perfect cooperation even if there is anonymous random matching after each stage game and all 
information about an individual’s prior history is strictly private. Under the same parameters, 
these games also have perfect, sequential equilibria that support perfect coordination when some 
   Column  Player 
   X  Y 
X 20,20  0,  30  Row 
Player Y 30,  0  10,10 
 
Figure 1: The stage game  
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information about an individual’s history is transmitted to the individual with whom that person 
is currently matched. Appendix A provides further details. Given that the expected length of a 
supergame is 10 repetitions of the stage game, subjects have experience with several supergames 
over the course of a two-hour session. 
There are three treatment variables in our main design.  The first treatment variable is the 
matching protocol (fixed pairings; random pairings).  The second treatment variable is the size of 
the population (N=14 or N=6).  The third treatment variable is the information conveyed to each 
member of a pair playing a stage game regarding the history of the other member of the pair.  
Since, in fixed pairings each member of a pair shares a complete history with the other member 





The basic hypothesis to be tested is that there is no significant difference in the level of 
cooperative play observed under anonymous-fixed and anonymous-random matching protocols.  
In a given session, the matching protocol is made public through the instructions that are read out 
loud.  In most sessions, the protocol does not change during the course of a session. Subjects are 
either assigned to a fixed pairing at the beginning of a supergame or are randomly paired after 
each stage of a supergame.  In sessions in which a fixed pairing protocol is used, the fixed 
pairings changed from one supergame to the next in a round robin format; prior to the first round 
of each new supergame, each player was anonymously matched with one of the N-1 players with 
whom s/he had not previously played a supergame.
7  In some sessions, one matching protocol is 
used at the beginning of a session and then the second protocol is used for the remainder of the 
session.  In those sessions in which two protocols are used, subjects are not informed of the 
                                                 
7  Hence, for the fixed-pairings treatment, up to N-1 supergames could be played where in each supergame, the 
players in a anonymous fixed pairing have not previously met one another. This consideration motivated our choice 
of N=14, as we typically played no more than 13 supergames in a session (see Table 1). If more than N-1 
supergames were played in a session, (as in sessions where N=6), then players were matched with players with 
whom they had played before. However, as these matchings were anonymous, players could not condition on their 
past history of play with any other player.  
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change in protocol until the point in the session at which the switch is made.  This treatment 
allows us to observe how a given group of subjects responds to a change in matching protocol. 
A second hypothesis to be tested is that in an anonymous, random matching environment 
the relative frequency of cooperative play is unaffected by the amount of information about an 
individual’s own history that is available to the person with whom that individual is matched.  A 
competing hypothesis is that the more information an individual has available to label a player a 
non-cooperator, the greater likelihood that individuals will refrain from non-cooperative play in 
the random matching environment.  The amount of information about one player’s history that is 
transmitted to the other player is a second treatment variable in our design.  This variable, I, can 
take on one of three values: 0 (no information is transmitted); 1 (the average payoff in the 
individual’s last game is transmitted); 2 (the action chosen by the individual last period is 
transmitted). Under all conditions, the matching and information transmission are done so as to 
preserve the anonymity of each person.  When I = 0, each player can only condition his/her own 
strategy on his/her own history.  Only an individual who has actually experienced non-
cooperative play has any reason to update his/her own priors about the relative frequency of 
playing future games with another individual who has had the same experience. This is the case 
considered by Kandori (1992).  Intuitively, among the information treatments we consider, the 
I=0 case would seem to be the least conducive to the development of a fear of contagion 
necessary to sustain cooperation.  When I > 0, each player can condition his action on not only 
her/his own history, but on the information provided about his opponent’s history.  Furthermore, 
when I>0, each player knows that the player with whom they will be matched next period will 
possess information that may (when I= 1) or will (I = 2) be sufficient to label her/him a ‘non-
cooperator’ if s/he chooses to defect this period. The more nearly complete is the information on 
an opponents’ immediate past history, the greater is the likelihood that past non-cooperative acts 
will be met with non-cooperation in the present game and induce a contagious reaction that 
would make current deviation from cooperation unprofitable. Indeed, giving players information 
on other players’ histories prior to the play of a stage game should serve to speed up the onset of 
the contagious equilibrium thereby strengthening the threat by which a norm of cooperative 
behavior is sustained.  On the other hand, Kandori’s theorem does not require that players posses  
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such information on their opponent’s immediate past history of play.  Hence our null hypothesis 




We report results from 24 experimental sessions involving a total of 274 subjects. A description 
of the characteristics of these experimental sessions is given in Table 1.  In most sessions we 
used a population size of N=14.  In six sessions we considered a smaller population of size N=6 
as a robustness check on our results with the larger population size.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Our aim was to get approximately 100 rounds of data per session.  As the length of each 
indefinitely repeated game (supergame) should average 10 rounds, our goal of 100 rounds per 
session was satisfied by playing an average of 10 indefinitely repeated games per session.  Of 
course, due to the random end of each indefinitely repeated game, there is some variation in the 
number of games and rounds as indicated in Table 1.  Subjects were not told of our objective of 
100 rounds, nor were they told in advance which indefinitely repeated game would be the last 
one played.  Subjects were recruited for a two-hour session but our goal of 100 rounds was 
always achieved well before this two-hour limit, typically after around 90 minutes. 
The subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at the University of 
Pittsburgh. Each group of subjects had no prior experience participating in any treatment of our 
experiment. Subjects were read instructions pertaining to the single treatment they were 
participating in and then began playing, entering their choices, X or Y, on a computer screen 
when prompted.  Copies of the instructions used in the fixed and the random pairings (I=0) 
treatments are included in Appendix B.  All treatments involved the same stage game as shown 
in Figure 1.  Following their choice of action, X or Y, subjects were informed of the other 
player’s action and their payoff.  The payoff numbers for the game, as shown in Figure 1 were 
interpreted as monetary payoffs in terms of cents (US$). Thus, if two players chose Y,Y in a 
round, each player earned 10 cents, etc.  Subjects were paid their payoffs from all rounds of all  
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games played and in addition were given a show-up payment of $5.  Average total earnings 
depended on the treatment. In the fixed pairings treatment, subject’s total earnings (including the 
$5 showup fee) averaged $18.64.  In the random pairings treatment (I=0, N=14) subjects’ total 
earnings averaged $14.86. 
 
3.3.1  Fixed Versus Random Pairings with No Information, 14 Subjects 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
The left column of Figure 2 presents data on the aggregate frequency of cooperation in each 
round of each game played in four sessions that were conducted under a fixed pairings matching 
protocol with 14 subjects. The horizontal axis reports round numbers.  A round number of 1, 
represented in Figure 2 (and subsequent figures) by a vertical bar, indicates the start of a new 
supergame. The right column of Figure 2 presents the aggregate frequency of cooperation in 
each round of each game played in the four sessions that were conducted under the random 
pairings matching protocol when subjects received no information (I=0) regarding the past 
experience of anyone with whom they were currently matched. While subjects who played under 
the random pairings protocol were randomly paired after each round of play, the procedure was 
to terminate a sequence of rounds with the same stopping rule as was used in the fixed pairings 
matching protocol sessions.  When a sequence ended, the end of the ‘game’ was announced. If 
our criteria of obtaining approximately 100 rounds of play had not yet been reached, we 
announced that a new game would begin. Therefore, a round number of 1 on these graphs also 
indicates when a new sequence of rounds was begun.  In the graphs shown in Figure 2, we report 
both the aggregate frequency of cooperation—% choice of action X— together with a fitted line 
from a regression of %X on a constant and time, t,=1,2…T (where T is the total number of 
rounds played in all supergames of the session). A tabular display of the aggregate frequencies of 
cooperation for the fixed and random, I=0 matching sessions with 14 subjects is presented in 
Table 2.  For comparison purposes, Table 2 also reports statistics for the random matching I=1 
and I=2 treatments which are discussed later in the text. 




The column in Table 2 labeled “Game 1, Round 1” reports the aggregate frequency of 
cooperative play (i.e., choice of X) in the first round of the first game played in each session 
involving 14 subjects.  According to nonparametric, robust rank-order tests
8, there is no 
significant difference (p>.10) in the distribution of these Game 1, Round 1 cooperation 
frequencies between the Fixed and Random, I=0 (or between the Fixed and Random, I=1) 
treatments.  Thus, the difference between the fixed and random matching protocols is not 
immediately taken into account by subjects.  
While there is no difference in the way inexperienced subjects first play these games, 
experience under the fixed protocol drives each group of subjects to a much higher level of 
cooperative play than is observed under any of the random pairings treatments (I=0,1,2).  Under 
random pairings, as subjects gain experience, the frequency of cooperation plummets towards 
zero.  By contrast, under fixed pairings, as a session progresses, the frequency of cooperative 
play increases.  Indeed, as subjects gain experience, the difference in cooperative frequencies 
between fixed and the random pairing treatments increases. 
More precisely, robust rank-order tests of the null hypothesis of no difference between 
treatments confirm that the aggregate cooperation frequencies over the first half, over the second 
half, and over all rounds of a session (as reported in Table 2) are significantly higher in the fixed 
pairings treatment than in either the random, I=0 or I=1 treatments (p =.014, smallest critical 
value for paired samples with 4 observations each).
9  Furthermore, in the fixed pairings 
treatment, the cooperation frequencies in the second half of the sessions are significantly higher 
than those in the first half (p=.014). By contrast, in the Random I=0 treatment, the cooperation 
frequencies in the second half of the sessions are only marginally significantly lower than those 
in the first half (p=.10), and in the Random I=1 treatment, one cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of no difference in the cooperation frequencies between the first and second halves of sessions 
(p>.10). 
                                                 
8  See Siegel and Castellan (1988) or Feltovich (2003) for a discussion of the robust rank order test. This test is used 
throughout this paper, wherever p-values are reported in the text. 
9
  As there is only one session/observation for the random pairings, I=2 treatment, we cannot use the robust rank 
order test to test for differences between this treatment and the others. Results from the single session of the random 
I=2 treatment suggest that cooperation levels are likely to be substantially lower in this environment than under 
fixed pairings, but not dissimilar from cooperation levels observed in the random pairings I=0,1 treatments.  
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An interesting property of the data in all sessions is the increase in cooperation observed 
in the first round of many of the supergames relative to the level of cooperation in the final 
rounds of the preceding supergame. This ‘restart’ phenomenon shows up in all of our treatments 
as revealed in Figure 2 (see also Figures 5, 6, 7).  It is clearly seen in Figure 3a, which shows the 
aggregate frequency of cooperation in the first round of all supergames as well as the aggregate 
frequency of cooperation in all other rounds, excluding the first round of all supergames across 
the fixed and random treatments with 14 subjects. The figure reveals that on average, 
cooperation is greater in the first round than over all subsequent rounds of each supergame.   
[Insert Figures 3a-3b here] 
In the random pairings treatment, the restart effect reflects repeated efforts by just a few 
subjects to encourage a social norm of cooperation. Some evidence for the existence of such 
cooperating types can be found in Table 3, which reports the cumulative number (cumulative 
percent) of players in each fixed or random pairings session with 14 subjects whose individual 
frequencies of cooperation fell below various threshold levels, using data from all rounds of all 
supergames of a session, as well as for the first and second halves of a session. For instance, in 
Session 2 of the Random, I=0 pairings treatment, there were 2 subjects who cooperated (chose 
action X) in 10 to 25 percent of all rounds played, while in session 4 of this same treatment, there 
were 3 subjects who cooperated in 25 to 50 percent of all rounds played.  In session 2 of the 
Random, I=1 treatment, one subject chose to cooperate in more than 75 percent of all rounds 
played. However most of these cooperating-types are cooperating with low frequency, typically 
in the first round of each new supergame. As a random-pairings session continues, some of these 
first-round cooperators get discouraged, and shift to defecting in the first round. This has the 
effect of dampening out the restart effect and reducing first-round cooperation frequencies in the 
random matching treatments as shown in Figure 3b.   
To see that this is the case, let us (arbitrarily) label a player who cooperates more than 10 
percent of the time in the first half of a random matching session (I=0 or 1) a “hopeful” player. 
For instance, in session 1 of the Random, I=0 treatment, Table 3 reveals that there is exactly 1 
hopeful player; in session 2 there are 3 hopeful players, in session 3, there are 6 hopeful players 
and in session 4 there are 12 hopeful players. A similar count of hopeful players can be made for 
the Random, I=1 treatment; in session 1 there are 9, in session 2, there are 8, in session 3 there  
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are 8 and in session 4 there are 13.  In all 8 of these sessions, Table 3 reveals that the number of 
hopeful players always declines from the first to the second half of the session.  
This reduction in the number of hopeful players tends to dampen out the ‘restart’ 
phenomenon as additional supergames are played, as the hopeful players are mainly cooperating 
in the first round of a supergame. This dampening out of the restart phenomenon in the random 
matchings treatments is illustrated in Figure 3b, which shows the aggregate frequency of 




[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
In the fixed pairings treatment, the aggregate level of cooperation within a given 
sequence of rounds (supergame) tends to diminish as the number of rounds played in that 
sequence increases, as can be seen in Figure 2 or in the aggregate frequencies shown in Figure 
3a.  The decline in the aggregate frequency of cooperation over time is due to the presence of 
just a few players, who very frequently chose to defect, despite being in the fixed pairings 
treatment.  The presence of these  defecting players can again be seen in Table 3.  For instance, 
in Sessions 1, 2 and 3 of the fixed pairings sessions, we see that there are always 1 or 2 
individuals who were choosing action X (cooperating) in less than 10 percent of all rounds 
played, (defecting more than 90 percent of the time).  As in the random pairings treatment, there 
is a “restart” phenomenon where the aggregate level of cooperation increases at the beginning of 
a new sequence with new pairings, from the level observed at the end of the previous sequence.  
Unlike the random pairings treatment, there is an upward trend in the aggregate level of 
cooperation observed the first time new pairings interact, in the first round of each supergame – 
see Figure 3b.   
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
                                                 
10 As noted above in the discussion of Table 1, some sessions had more than 10 supergames, and some had less. In 
Figure 3b, we have reported the average frequency of cooperation in supergame number 1,2,…10 for all sessions of 
a treatment for which that supergame was actually played.  
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As Figure 4 makes clear, on average, the aggregate frequency of cooperation is a little 
more than 10 percent lower at the end of each supergame relative to the start of that supergame. 
The reason for this finding is that in each fixed pairing session there is typically a small core of 
players – ‘defectors’ – who defect with a high frequency as can be seen in Table 3.  In the first 
rounds of play of a new supergame, these defectors’ impact on the aggregate frequency of 
cooperation is at its weakest.  However, if the defectors are in fixed pairings with subjects 
playing conditionally cooperative strategies, these conditional cooperators will quickly switch 
from cooperating to defecting, thereby further lowering the aggregate frequency of cooperation 
as the supergame proceeds.  Nevertheless, the upward trend in the frequency of cooperation in 
the first round of each new supergame is sufficiently strong that the aggregate frequency of 
cooperation increases over time.   
This upward trend in first-round cooperation under fixed pairings – as shown in Figure 
3b- is due to a reduction in the number of ‘near-unconditional’ defectors as a session proceeds.  
To see that this is the case, let us (again, arbitrarily) label a player who cooperates less than 10 
percent of the time in the first half of a fixed pairing session a “pessimistic” player.  As Table 3 
reveals, in two of the four fixed pairing sessions, (numbers 2 and 4), the number of these 
pessimists drops from 1 or 2 in the first half of the session to 0 in the second half of the session. 
If pessimists were alternatively defined as those who cooperated less than 50% of the time, a 
starker drop-off in the number of pessimists would be found from the first to the second half of 
all four fixed pairings sessions.
11  
We conclude that, under fixed pairings there appears to develop a social norm of 
cooperation as a given group of subjects gains experience, while under the various random 
pairings treatments, experience tends to drive groups toward a far more competitive norm. 
 
3.3.2 The Effect of Group Size 
 
A group size of 14 is, theoretically, sufficiently small for the existence of a cooperative 
equilibrium under random matching with no information transmission.  Indeed, as detailed in 
                                                 
11  We have verified that this drop-off in the number of pessimists is due to changes in the actions chosen by the 
players labeled as pessimists in the first half of the session.  Players who were not labeled as pessimists in the first 
half of a session are almost never labeled as pessimists in the second half of a session.  
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Appendix A, our parameterization of the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game admits a 
cooperative equilibrium under random pairings and no information for any group of size 2-30.  
However, the threat of setting off a contagion process does not appear to be sufficient to sustain 
cooperation in random matching environments with a group of size 14.  Figure 5 below displays 
the results observed in sessions in which a smaller group of 6 subjects were matched either in 
fixed pairings for the duration of a supergame or randomly in each round of a supergame with no 
information about their opponent’s prior history of play – 3 sessions of each treatment.  In the 
experimental sessions with groups of 6 subjects, we followed the same experimental procedures 
as in the sessions with 14 subjects. With a smaller group size, a contagion process will get back 
to its originator much more quickly and the threat of setting off such a process should provide a 
correspondingly larger incentive to cooperate.  As the data in Figure 5 reveal, when there is no 
information feedback, under random matching the smaller groups behave as competitively as the 
larger groups. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
A tabular display of the aggregate frequency of cooperation in the eight sessions with 6 subjects   
is presented in Table 4. 
     [Insert  Table  4  here] 
 
As in the sessions with 14 subjects, robust rank-order tests reveal that the distribution of 
cooperation frequencies in the first stage game played in the fixed pairings treatment is no 
different than that observed for the random, I=0 pairings treatment.  Under the fixed matching 
protocol, the aggregate frequency of cooperation increases with experience in all four sessions 
with 6 subjects, while under the random matching protocol the aggregate frequency of 
cooperation diminishes with experience in two of the three sessions.
12   Rank-order tests further 
                                                 
12  In session #3 of the random, I=0 treatment with 6 subjects, there was a slight increase the aggregate frequency of 
cooperation over time-see Figure 5; the slope of the fitted line for this session is positive, though not significantly 
different from zero. This slight upward trend is owing to the increase, over time, in cooperation frequencies in the 
first few rounds of each new supergame. However, there continues to be a dramatic fall-off in the cooperation  over 
the course of each supergame, contrary to the findings in the fixed pairings treatment.   
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confirm that the aggregate cooperation frequencies over the first half, over the second half, and 
over all rounds of a session (as reported in Table 4) are significantly higher in the fixed pairings 
treatment than in the random, I=0 treatment. (p≤ .029).   A comparison of the aggregate 
cooperation frequencies (over the first half, second half, or all rounds of a session) achieved by 
groups of 14 subjects in the random, I=0 treatment with those achieved by groups of 6 subjects 
in the same treatment (cf. Tables 2 and 4) yields no significant differences (p>.10). Similarly, a 
comparison of the cooperation frequencies achieved by groups of size 14 or 6 under the fixed 
pairings protocol also yields no significant differences. We conclude that group size has no 
statistically significant effect on aggregate cooperation rates. 
 
3.3.3 The Effect of Prior Conditioning 
 
A group of subjects who gain experience with the fixed pairings protocol tends to exhibit a high 
degree of cooperation.  It is natural to ask whether the social norm of cooperation such a group 
had exhibited under fixed pairings will be sustained when the group is switched to a random 
matching protocol.  Conversely, if a group has exhibited a social norm of non-cooperation under 
a random matching protocol will that experience inhibit the formation of a cooperative norm if 
they are switched to a fixed pairings protocol?   To study the effect of prior conditioning on the 
nature of the social norm developed under a given matching protocol we conducted five sessions 
in which subjects were first matched under one protocol and then, sometime during the middle of 
each experimental session, they were switched to another matching protocol. This type of design 
is referred to as a “within-subjects” design and stands in contrast to the “between-subjects” 
design we have used up to now.
13  The switch in matching protocols was not announced in 
advance. When the switch was made, we handed out and read aloud a brief change in the 
instructions, which explained to subjects the new matching protocol that would be in effect in all 
subsequent rounds. We then played several supergames under this new protocol. All other 
procedures were as before.  
                                                 
13  Within-subject designs yield findings that are less susceptible to individual differences than  between-subject 
designs, e.g., a subject who had too little sleep before an experimental session is nevertheless present in all 
treatments of a within-subjects design, but is only in one treatment of a between-subjects design. On the other hand, 
between-subject designs allow subjects to acquire more experience with a particular treatment than within-subject 
design sessions of the same duration.  
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Figure 6 shows data on cooperation frequencies from the five within-subjects sessions we 
conducted with 14 inexperienced subjects per session.  The left column of Figure 6 displays data 
from three sessions in which subjects were first matched according to the fixed pairings protocol 
and then, without prior announcement switched to a random pairings protocol in the manner 
describe above. The right column of Figure 6 displays data from two sessions with the opposite 
order of use of protocol. 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
When subjects are first matched under fixed pairings, they quickly achieve a high level of 
cooperation.  However, the switch to the random matching protocol produces an immediate, 
dramatic decline in the rate of cooperation and, as the session continues, the rate of cooperation 
quickly tends to zero.  In short, there is no evidence that a group of people who have learned to 
cooperate under fixed pairings will develop a social norm of cooperation that persists when 
matched randomly. Conversely, as shown in the right column of Figure 6, experience with 
random matching that has led members of a group to behave competitively does not prevent the 
group from immediately making a marked increase in the cooperation rates in response to a 
switch to the fixed pairing protocol and, with experience, achieving very high sustained levels of 
cooperation.  Indeed, the data suggest that a group that has experienced the competitive 
outcomes under random matching may learn to cooperate under fixed pairings even more rapidly 
than groups who have not had such experience.  
 
3.3.4  The Effect of Information Transmission 
 
In the random pairings, I=1 treatment, prior to play of the stage game, each player is told the 
average payoff received by his opponent and the person with whom his opponent was paired in 
the last stage game. There are just three possibilities for this average payoff: 10, 15 or 20. If the 
report is 10 (20), then it is known that the opponent played Y (X) in the last stage game.  If the 
report is 15, then it is known that either the opponent, or his matched pair, but not both, played Y 
in the last period. In this information treatment, a player who was seeking to signal to a future 
opponent her determination (say) to play the cooperative action X by choosing X this period  
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would be unable to do so unambiguously.  Figure 7 displays the aggregate frequency of 
cooperation achieved in four sessions conducted under this information condition with groups of 
14 subjects who were matched under the random matching protocol. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
The aggregate cooperation frequencies for this treatment were reported earlier in Table 2.  As 
we noted in the discussion of Table 2, a comparison of the behavior of subjects in their first 
round of experience under the fixed matching protocol and the random matching protocol with 
information feedback (I=1) indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in initial 
behavior (game 1, round 1). As in the random matching protocol sessions with no information 
feedback (I=0), there is no indication of any trend increase in cooperation rates with experience 
and the level of cooperation achieved is quite low relative to that observed under the fixed 
pairings matching protocol. While cooperation frequencies in the fixed pairings treatment are 
significantly higher than those achieved in the random, I=1 treatment, the cooperation 
frequencies in the random, I=1 treatment are significantly higher than those achieved in the 
random, I=0 treatment (over the first half, second half and all rounds of a session - probability of 
rejecting the null of no difference, p =.014, lowest value possible with four observations).  These 
findings do not appear to change if the group consists of just 6 rather than 14 subjects.  Figure 8 
shows aggregate cooperation frequencies in a single session we conducted with 6 subjects under 
the random matching, I=1 protocol.  The aggregate cooperation frequency in this session looks 
very similar to that shown in Figure 7 for the same treatment with 14 subjects or to the random 
I=0 sessions with 6 subjects shown in Figure 5.  We conclude that the additional information 
given in the I=1 treatment yields some increase in cooperative play, but that the trend in 
cooperative behavior as subjects gain experience is much more similar to the random, I=0 
treatment than to the fixed pairings treatment, regardless of group size. 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
A similar finding obtains for the random pairings protocol under information condition I=2, 
which corresponds to the case where, prior to play of the stage game, players are informed of the 
action (X or Y) that their opponent chose in the previous round of play when matched with 
another player. This is a different kind of information than is given in the I=1 treatment; in the 
I=2 treatment, there is no ambiguity about the action chosen by a player’s opponent in the  
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previous period.  Providing unambiguous information on an opponent’s action choice prior to 
play of the stage game makes it straightforward to label that opponent as a cooperator/defector 
before playing the game. However, the payoff information in the I=1 treatment reveals whether 
the opponent or his partner defected in the last round and therefore provides more information 
about whether a contagious process has started than does the information provided in the I=2 
treatment.
14  For this reason, we conducted just one session of the random pairings, I=2 treatment 
with 14 subjects, and the aggregate outcome is presented in Figure 9.   
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
Again we see that there is no indication of any trend increase in cooperation rates as subjects 
gain experience. Aggregate statistics for this session are given in Table 2. While we do not have 
enough observations of this treatment to make any definitive conclusions, it appears on the basis 
of the single observation that we do have that there is not much difference in aggregate outcomes 
between the random pairings, I=2 and I=1 treatments. As was the case with the random I=1 
treatment, cooperation levels might be higher in the random I=2 treatment relative to the random, 
no information treatment I=0. Nevertheless the random I=2 treatment gives rise to the same trend 
decrease in cooperation rates over time that is observed in both the random I=0 and I=1 
treatments. 
 
4.  Concluding Observations 
 
Ellison (1994) observed that Kandori’s theorem cast doubt on claims that the development of 
private local institutions, providing information on the reputations of individuals who participate 
in trade with various partners in the absence of enforceable contracts, were essential for the 
continued success of medieval trade fairs (Milgrom, et al. (1990)) and the international trading 
ventures of Maghribi traders (Grief (1989)).   The experiment we report on in this paper shows 
that under anonymous random matching there is no evidence of the development of a 
cooperative norm even under the conditions of small group interaction or limited information 
about an opponent’s past actions or histories.  This finding gives weight to the argument that 
                                                 
14  Unambiguously labeling a player as a cooperator or defector may enhance reputational concerns as stressed, e.g., 




without the development of the kinds of institutions that can make an individual’s reputation 
public, the systems of trading at medieval fairs and international trade conducted amongst 
members of the same tribe could not have been sustained. 
Ellison also observed that Kandori’s theorem cast doubt on claims by experimenters that 
random, anonymous matching was sufficient to prevent subjects from treating all repetitions of a 
game played during an experimental session as a single supergame.
15 Our findings indicate that, 
as a matter of fact,  the behavior of subjects who are in fixed pairings for the duration of a 
supergame is markedly different from the behavior of subjects who play a sequence of one shot 
games with random re-matching of anonymous players after each game is played.  This finding 
suggests that random matching amongst anonymous players does, in fact, tend to suppress the 
inclination of subjects to treat all trials in a given session as a single supergame.  
Finally, the results of our experiment establish empirically that in indefinitely repeated PD 
games played with fixed pairings, a community norm of cooperation becomes possible as 
subjects gain experience. This norm is achieved in both large and small groups, despite the 
anonymity of pairings and the presence of some `pessimistic’ players, and even in cases where 





In this appendix we explain how we verified the existence of a “contagious” equilibrium as 
described in Kandori (1992, section 4) for the parameterization of the prisoner’s dilemma game 
we examined in the pilot experiment and which we intend to use in further experimental 
sessions. We also establish that under this same parameterization, the cooperative outcome can 
be supported as equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game if both players in a fixed pairing 
adhere to a grim trigger strategy. 
Let the stage game be described by the following symmetric payoff table showing the 
payoffs to the row player only 
                                                 
15 Experimenters know that subject behavior changes with experience.  They wish to give subjects experience with 
a game without creating a supergame.  A concern that subjects may treat all of the repetitions of a game played 
during an experimental session as a supergame, even when the intent is simply to give subjects experience with the 
game, has a long history.  In commenting on the early Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment conducted by Flood and 
Dresher, John Nash claimed that “The flaw in this experiment as a test of equilibrium point theory is that the 
experiment really amounts to having the players play one large multimove game…..Since 100 trials are so long that 
(backward induction is likely to fail) …it is fairly clear that one should expect (behavior) which is most appropriate 
for indeterminate end games...”  Flood (1958, p. 16).  
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 C  D 
C w x 
D y z 
 
Here C is the cooperative action and D is the defect action (labeled X and Y in the experiment). 
In our experimental environment (unlike Kandori (1992)), we restricted w, x, y and z to 
be strictly nonnegative.  Specifically, as noted in the text, we chose w=20, x=0, y=30 and z=10 
so that the game is a prisoner’s dilemma. To translate into Kandori’s notation, the gain from 
defection,  w y g − = , and the loss when cheated,  x z − = l . Given our parameterization, 
. 10 = = l g   
 
A.1 Cooperative Equilibrium With Random Pairings 
 
As in Kandori, letδ  be the period discount factor and let M denote the population size. 
The M players are randomly paired in each round of an indefinitely repeated game. Suppose 
there are just two types of players in the population. Type c players are those whose history of 
play includes no defections; otherwise, a player is a type d player forever. The "contagious 
strategy" is for players to play the action corresponding to their type, i.e. type c’s play C and type 
d’s play D. Kandori (1992 Theorem 1) shows that the contagious strategy is a sequential 
equilibrium strategy for any given g and M provided that δ  and l are sufficiently large. 
Following Kandori’s (1992) notation, let  t X  be total number of type d players in period t 
and let A be an  M M ×  transition matrix with elements  { }. | Pr 1 t i X j X a t ij = = = +  Similarly, let 
B be an  M M × transition matrix with elements 
{} t and i X j X b t t ij   at time   C   playing    to deviates player    d    type one       | Pr 1 = = = + . The matrix H=B-
A characterizes how the diffusion of d types is delayed if one d type unilaterally deviates from 
the contagious strategy. The conditional probability that a type d player randomly meets a type c 
player when there are i d types is given by the ith element of the column vector 
T M M
M





= ρ . 
Finally, let  i e  be a  M × 1 row vector with the ith element equal to 1 and all other elements equal 
to 0. Using the notation given above, we restate Kandori’s Lemma. 
  The contagious equilibrium constitutes a sequential equilibrium if, first, a one-shot 
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The left hand side is the expected payoff from cooperating forever and the right hand side is the 
expected payoff from defecting forever. The term  ρ
t A e1  is the probability of meeting a type c 
player at time t given that the player was the first to defect at t=0. The above expression can be 
simplified to yield  
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            (1) 
which is comparable to equation (1) in Kandori (1992) under his normalization of w=1, z=0 and 
using the definition y=w+g. 
  A second, sufficient condition for the contagious equilibrium strategy to be equilibrium is 
that a one-shot deviation off the equilibrium path (a type d plays C) is unprofitable under any 
consistent belief. Specifically, the condition is that a type d player finds a one-shot deviation 
from playing D forever to be unprofitable given  : ,..., 3 , 2   all for    , M k k X t = =  











































z A e y A e ρ ρ δ δ ρ ρ δ . 
The left hand side is the expected payoff from defecting forever when there are k d-type players 
including the player himself. The right hand side is what the player earns by deviating in the 
current period --playing C -- and then playing D forever;  ) 1 /( ) ( − − M k M is the probability of 
meeting a type c player and  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( − − M k is the probability of meeting a type d player. Finally, 
B ek is the distribution of the number of type d players in the next period given that in the current 
period there are k type d players and one of them (the player under consideration) deviates to 
playing C in the current period. The above expression can be simplified to yield 


























− − ρ δ δ           (2) 
which is again comparable to equation (2) in Kandori (1992) under his normalization of w=1, 
z=0 and using the definition  w y g − = and  . x z − = l  
  To check whether conditions (1-2) are satisfied under our parameterization of the stage 
game and for our choices of M and δ , we require the transition matrices A and H. Formulas for 
constructing these matrices are provided in Kandori (1989) and for completeness we reproduce 
these formulas here. 
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Using this definition, a closed form solution for the  M M × transition matrix A is given by the 
following formula. For j=i, i+2, i+4,..., min[2i, M], if i is even and for j=i+1, i+3, i+5,..., 
min[2i, M] if i is odd, 
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. 0 = ij a  
A closed form solution for the M M × transition matrix  A B h H ij − = = ) (  is given by the 
following formula. For j=i+2, i+4,..., min[2i, M], if i is even, and for j=i+1, i+3,..., min[2i, M] 
if i is odd,  
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= −  
otherwise 
. 0 = ij h  
  Using these definitions for the matrices A and H, we have verified that conditions (1-2) 
are satisfied for our parameter choices  , 90 . = δ w=20, x=0, y=30 z=10 for even integer values of 
M over the range  . 30 2 ≤ ≤ M
16  (The maximum number of computers we have available in our 
computer laboratory is 30). 
 
A.2 Cooperative Equilibrium with Fixed Pairings 
 
When players remain paired with the same player for the duration of an indefinitely 
repeated game, a strategy where each player plays C in all rounds of the game is an equilibrium 
under our parameterization if players adhere to a “grim trigger” strategy, i.e. begin by 
cooperating and if the history of play ever includes a defection, defect forever, otherwise 
continue cooperating.   
Specifically, consider a player who decides to deviate from playing C in the current 
round. His one time gain from doing so, g=y-w. Since the other player is playing a grim trigger 
strategy, the deviant player faces a loss of w-z in the following period and forever after. Hence, 
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This is simply the condition that a deviation from the grim trigger strategy is unprofitable. Since 
y-w=w-z=10 in our parameterization, this condition reduces to  , 50 . δ <  which is readily satisfied 
by our choice of  . 90 . = δ   Hence, the grim trigger strategy supporting cooperative play is an 
equilibrium in the fixed pairings environment that we consider.
                                                 
16  A Mathematica program that checks these conditions is available at http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/pd/  
 
25
Appendix B  
This appendix provides the written instructions used in the two main treatments of the 
experiment, the fixed pairings treatment and the random matching I=0 treatment. 
Instructions for these and all other treatments may be found at 
http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/pd/ 
 
B.1 Instructions used in the fixed pairings treatment 
Overview 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  The National Science Foundation has 
provided funds for this research.  During the course of the experiment, you will be called 
upon to make a series of decisions.  If you follow the instructions carefully and make good 
decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash 





The experiment is divided into a series of games.  A game will consist of an 
indefinite number of rounds.  At the beginning of each game you will be paired with 
someone else in this room.  You will be paired with this player for one game. In each round 
both of you will play the game described in the upper center portion of your screen.  In this 
game each of you can make either of two choices, X or Y.  The points you earn in a round 
depends upon both the choice you make and the choice made by the other person with 
whom you are matched.  As the payoff table on your screen indicates: 
 
If both of you choose X this round then:   you both earn 20 points. 
 
  If you choose X this round and the other person chooses Y then:  you earn 0 points and 
the other person earns 30 points. 
 
  If you choose Y this round and the other person chooses X then: you earn 30 points and 
the other person earns 0 points. 
 
  If you both choose Y this round then:   you both earn 10 points. 
 
  To make your choice in each round, click the radio button next to either X or Y.  
You may change your mind any time prior to clicking the submit button by simply clicking 
on the button next to X or Y. You are free to choose X or Y in every round.  When you are 
satisfied with your choice, click on the submit button. The computer program will record 
your choice and the choice made by the player with whom you are matched.  After all 
players have made their choices, the results of the round will appear on the lower portion of 
your screen.  You will be reminded of your own choice and will be shown the choice of the 
player with whom you are matched as well as the number of points you have earned for the  
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round. Record the results of the round on your RECORD SHEET under the appropriate 
headings. 
Immediately after you have received information on your choice and the choice of 
the person with whom you are matched for a given round, the computer program will 
randomly select a number from 1 to 100. The selected number will appear on a popup box 
in the middle of your screen. If this random number is less than 91, the game will continue 
into the next round. If the number selected is greater than 90 the game is over.  Therefore, 
after each round there is a 90% chance that you will play another round with the same 
individual and a 10% chance that the game will end.   
 
Suppose that a number less than 91 has been drawn.  Then you click on the OK 
button, eliminating the popup box, and the next round is played.  You will play the same 
game with the same individual as in the previous rounds   Before making you choice, you 
may review all the outcomes of all of the prior games in the sequence by scrolling down 
the history record.  You then choose either X or Y.  Your choice and the choice of the 
person with whom you are matched are recorded and added to the history record at the 
lower portion of your screen.  You record the outcome and your point earnings for the 
round.  The computer then randomly selects a number between 1 and 100 to determine 
whether the game continues for another round.  
 
If the number drawn is greater than 90 then the game ends. The experimenter will 
announce whether or not a new game will be played.  If a new game is to be played then 
you will be matched with someone different from those you have been matched with in 




 Each point that you earn is worth 1 cent ( $.01).  Therefore, the more points you 
earn the more money you earn.  You will be paid your earnings from all rounds played 




First, do not discuss your choices or your results with anyone at any time during the 
experiment.   
 
Second, your ID# is private.  Do not reveal it to anyone. 
 
Third, remember that you are paired with the same individual for the entire 
sequence of rounds in a given game.  Since there is a 90% chance that at the end of a round 
the sequence will continue, you can expect, on average, to play 10 rounds with the same 
individual.  However, since the stopping decision is made randomly, some sequences may 
be much longer than 10 rounds and others may be much shorter. 
 
Questions?  
Now is the time for questions.  Does anyone have any questions before we begin?  
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This is an experiment in decision-making.  The National Science Foundation has 
provided funds for this research.  During the course of the experiment, you will be called 
upon to make a series of decisions.  If you follow the instructions carefully and make good 
decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash 





The experiment is divided into a series of games. A game will consist of an 
indefinite number of rounds.  At the beginning of each round you will be paired with 
someone else in this room.  You will be paired with this player for one round. In each 
round you will play the game described in the upper center portion of your screen.  In this 
game each of you can make either of two choices, X or Y.  The points you earn in a round 
depends upon both the choice you make and the choice made by the other person with 
whom you are matched.  As the payoff table on your screen indicates: 
 
If both of you choose X this round then:  you both earn 20 points. 
 
  If you choose X this round and the other person chooses Y then:  you earn 0 points and 
the other person earns 30 points. 
 
  If you choose Y this round and the other person chooses X then: you earn 30 points and 
the other person earns 0 points. 
 
  If you both choose Y then:  you both earn 10 points. 
 
  To make your choice in each round, click the radio button next to either X or Y.  
You may change your mind any time prior to clicking the submit button by simply clicking 
on the button next to X or Y. You are free to choose X or Y in every round.  When you are 
satisfied with your choice, click the submit button. The computer program will record your 
choice and the choice made by the player with whom you are matched.  After all players 
have made their choices, the results of the round will appear on the lower portion of your 
screen.  You will be reminded of your own choice and will be shown the choice of the 
player with whom you are matched as well as the number of points you have earned for the 
round. Record the results of the round on your RECORD SHEET under the appropriate 
headings. 
 
Immediately after you have received information on your choice and the choice of 
the person with whom you are matched for the round, the computer program will randomly 
select a number from 1 to 100. The selected number will appear on a popup box in the 
middle of your screen. If this random number is less than 91, the game will continue into  
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the next round. If the number selected is greater than 90 the sequence is over.  Therefore, 
after each round there is a 90% chance that you will play another round and a 10% chance 
that the game will end.   
Suppose that a number less than 91 has been drawn.  Then you press the OK button 
eliminating the popup box and the next round is played.  You will play the same game as in 
the previous round, but with an individual selected at random from all the individuals 
in the room. Before making your choice, you may review all the outcomes of all of the 
prior games in the sequence by scrolling down the history record.  You then choose either 
X or Y.  Your choice and the choice of the person with whom you are matched this round 
are recorded and added to the history record at the lower portion of your screen.  You 
record the outcome and your point earnings for the round.  The computer then randomly 
selects a number between 1 and 100 to determine whether the game continues for another 
round.  
 
If the number drawn is greater than 90 then the game ends. The experimenter will 
announce whether or not a new game will be played.  If a new game is to be played then 
you will be matched with someone drawn at random from the other people in the room. 




 Each point that you earn is worth 1 cent ( $.01).  Therefore, the more points you 
earn the more money you earn.  You will be paid your earnings from all rounds played 




First, do not discuss your choices or your results with anyone at any time during the 
experiment.   
 
Second, your ID# is private.  Do not reveal it to anyone. 
 
Third, since there is a 90% chance that at the end of a round the sequence will 
continue, you can expect, on average, to play 10 rounds in a given game sequence.  
However, since the stopping decision is made randomly, some sequences may be much 
longer than 10 rounds and others may be much shorter. 
 
Fourth, remember that after each round of a game you will be matched randomly 
with someone in this room.  Therefore, if there are N people in the room the probability of 
you being matched with the same individual in two consecutive rounds of a game is 1/(N-
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Fixed   1  14  11  59 
Fixed 2  14  10  96 
Fixed 3  14  13  131 
Fixed 4  14  10  115 
Random I=0  1  14  10  112 
Random I=0  2  14  12  104 
Random I=0  3  14  8  97 
Random I=0  4  14  8  89 
Random I=1  1  14  9  75 
Random I=1  2  14  9  106 
Random I=1  3  14  16  99 
Random I=1  4  14  9  105 
Random I=2  1  14  14  110 
Fixed Then Random I=0  1  14  15  134 
Fixed Then Random I=0  2  14  15  127 
Random I=0 Then Fixed  1  14  13  113 
Random I=0 Then Fixed  2  14  11  133 
Fixed 1  6  10  109 
Fixed 2  6  9  108 
Fixed 3  6  13  108 
Random I=0  1  6  12  104 
Random I=0  2  6  12  100 
Random I=0  3  6  7  88 









Table 2: Aggregate Frequencies of Cooperation 
All Sessions with 14 Subjects and a Single Matching Protocol 
  Game 1,  All Rounds  First Half of  Second Half 
Fixed  Round 1  of All Games  the Session  of the Session 
Session 1  0.786  0.548  0.478  0.617 
Session 2  0.286  0.576  0.457  0.695 
Session 3  0.571  0.477  0.408  0.545 
Session 4  0.286  0.608  0.520  0.695 
All Sessions  0.482  0.549  0.462  0.634 
        
  Game 1,  All Rounds  First Half of  Second Half 
Random I=0  Round 1  of All Games  the Session  of the Session 
Session 1  0.214  0.022  0.034  0.010 
Session 2  0.429  0.042  0.080  0.004 
Session 3  0.429  0.063  0.097  0.029 
Session 4  0.643  0.173  0.211  0.137 
All Sessions  0.429  0.075  0.105  0.045 
        
  Game 1,  All Rounds  First Half of  Second Half 
Random I=1  Round 1  of All Games  the Session  of the Session 
Session 1  0.429  0.135  0.197  0.075 
Session 2  0.500  0.185  0.168  0.202 
Session 3  0.571  0.144  0.143  0.144 
Session 4  0.571  0.225  0.236  0.214 
All Sessions  0.518  0.176  0.186  0.166 
        
  Game 1,  All Rounds  First Half of  Second Half 
Random I=2  Round 1  of All Games  the Session  of the Session 
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Figure 3a: Frequency of Cooperation in First Rounds Versus 
All Remaining Rounds of All SuperGames, Pooled Data, All 
Sessions of a Treatment
All First Rounds All Rounds But First
Figure 3b: Frequency of Cooperation in First Rounds of Supergames 1-
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Table 3: Individual Frequencies of Cooperation 
Fixed 
Pairings 
Cumulative Number (Cum %) of the 14 Subjects Whose Frequency of  Cooperation Falls Below Various Thresholds  
Over All Rounds and Over the 1
st Half and the 2
nd Half of Each Session 

























<.05  1 (.071)  1 (.071)  1 (.071)  0 (.000)  2 (.143)  0 (.000)  0 (.000)  0 (.000)  1 (.071)  0 (.000)  0 (.000)  0 (.000)  0.018 
<.10  1 (.071)  1 (.071)  1 (.071)  1 (.071)  2 (.143)  0 (.000)  2 (.143)  2 (.143)  2 (.143)  0 (.000)  1 (.071)  0 (.000)  0.071 
<.25  2 (.143)  3 (.339)  2 (.143)  1 (.071)  2 (.143)  1 (.071)  3 (.214)  4 (.286)  4 (.286)  0 (.000)  1 (.071)  0 (.000)  0.107 
<.50  4 (.286)  7 (.500)  5 (.357)  5 (.357)  9 (.643)  2 (.143)  7 (.500)  9 (.643)  7 (.500)  3 (.214)  7 (.500)  3 (.214)  0.339 
<.75  11 (.786)  11 (.786)  8 (.571)  11 (.786)  13 (.929)  7 (.500)  10 (.714)  14 (1.00)  8 (.571)  10 (.714)  12 (.857)  6 (.429)  0.750 




Cumulative Number (Cum %) of the 14 Subjects Whose Frequency of  Cooperation Falls Below Various Thresholds  
Over All Rounds and Over the 1
st Half and the 2
nd Half of Each Session 

























<.05  13 (.929)  10 (.714)  13 (.929)  9 (.643)  8 (.571)  13 (.929)  4 (.286)  1 (.071)  10 (.714)  1 (.071)  1 (.071)  4 (.286)  0.482 
<.10  13 (.929)  13 (.929)  14 (1.00)  12 (.857)  11 (.786)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  8 (.571)  14 (1.00)  3 (.214)  2 (.143)  5 (.357)  0.750 
<.25  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  13 (.929)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  11 (.786)  9 (.643)  12 (.857)  0.946 
<.50  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  1.000 
<.75  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  1.000 




Cumulative Number (Cum %) of the 14 Subjects Whose Frequency of  Cooperation Falls Below Various Thresholds  
Over All Rounds and Over the 1
st Half and the 2
nd Half of Each Session 

























<.05  5 (.357)  4 (.286)  8 (.571)  4 (.286)  2 (.143)  7 (.500)  5 (.357)  2 (.143)  7 (.500)  1 (.071)  0 (.000)  5 (.357)  0.268 
<.10  7 (.500)  5 (.357)  9 (.643)  6 (.429)  6 (.429)  7 (.500)  6 (.429)  6 (429)  9 (.571)  3 (.214)  1 (.071)  5 (.357)  0.393 
<.25  10 (.714)  8 (.571)  14 (1.00)  10 (.714)  9 (.643)  10 (.714)  11 (.786)  12 (.857)  10 (.714)  8 (.571)  6 (.429)  7 (.500)  0.696 
<.50  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  13 (.929)  13 (.929)  12 (.857)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  13 (.929)  14 (1.00)  13 (.929)  13 (.929)  0.982 
<.75  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  13 (.929)  14 (1.00)  13 (.929)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  0.982 
<=1.0  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  14 (1.00)  1.000  
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Figure 4:  Change in the Aggregate Frequency of Cooperation from the 
First to the Last Round of Each Supergame* 
































* Change is: Avg. % Cooperation in Final Round of Supergame - Avg. % Cooperation in First  









































Figure 5: Aggregate Frequency of Cooperation in Fixed (left column) and Random, I=0, (right column) Matching Sessions with 6 Subjects  
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Table 4: Aggregate Frequencies of Cooperation 
All Sessions with 6 Subjects and a Single Matching Protocol 
  Game 1,  All Rounds  First Half of  Second Half 
Fixed  Round 1  of All Games  the Session  of the Session 
Session 1  0.500  0.292  0.189  0.418 
Session 2  0.833  0.782  0.729  0.840 
Session 3  0.167  0.440  0.280  0.663 
All Sessions  0.500  0.505  0.399  0.634 
        
  Game 1,  All Rounds  First Half of  Second Half 
Random I=0  Round 1  of All Games  the Session  of the Session 
Session 1  0.500  0.072  0.102  0.045 
Session 2  0.667  0.167  0.217  0.117 
Session 3  0.500  0.208  0.216  0.201 






Figure 6: Within Subjects Treatments. 2 Sessions of Fixed followed by Random (I=0) Matching, 14 subjects each (left column) and 2 Sessions of 
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Figure 7: Aggregate Frequency of Cooperation in Four Random (I=1) Matching Sessions with 14 Subjects 
 
Random Pairings, Information on Immediate Past Average Payoffs, 
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Random Pairings, Information on Immediate Past Average Payoffs, 
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Frequency of Cooperation Fitted Line
Random Pairings, Information on Immediate Past Average Payoffs, 
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Random Pairings, Information on Immediate Past Average Payoffs, 
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Random Pairings, Information on Past Average Payoffs (I=1) 
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Figure 8: Aggregate Frequency of Cooperation in One Session of Random Pairings with 



























Random Pairings, Information on Immediate Past Actions (I=2) 
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Figure 9: Aggregate Frequency of Cooperation in One Session of Random Pairings with 
Information on Past Actions of Opponents (I=2), 14 Subjects 
 
 
 
 
 
 